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Arthur R. Rosen is a partner in the state and
local tax practice at McDermott Will & Emery.
Hayes R. Holderness is an assistant professor at
the University of Richmond School of Law.
In this edition of The Art of SALT, the authors
examine whether Congress should establish
stronger federal checks on state tax actions by
opening the federal courts to interstate
taxpayers.
Observers of the state and local tax world
regularly note the seemingly irresponsible actions
so often taken by state revenue agencies, by state
1
courts, and by state legislatures — a few recent
examples of states acting badly are set forth below.
In many ways federal law has encouraged these
types of actions by placing limited checks on the
2
states. The federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) and
the common law comity doctrine keep federal
courts off the states’ backs. Also, the Supreme
3
Court’s South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. decision and
its Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic

1

See, e.g., Mark W. Eidman and Arthur R. Rosen, “Non-Legislated Tax
Legislation,” State Tax Notes, Jan. 24, 2011, p. 301.
2
3

28 U.S.C. section 1341.
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U. S. __ (2018).

Association decision, in which state legislatures
were freed from congressional restraints
regarding the enactment of state gambling
statutes, will likely encourage states to push back
on virtually any federal effort in the interstate tax
arena. Adding fuel to this fire, most of the states
5
are now, in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, seeking
freedom from another check on their actions, by
asking the Supreme Court to overturn precedent
allowing state government actors to be sued in
sister state courts (this is similar to
Massachusetts’s efforts in Crutchfield Corp. v.
6
Harding ). State victories in these cases would
surely fan the flames of unchecked state behavior
into a veritable conflagration. There is, however,
the glimmer of a fire extinguisher at the end of the
tunnel — Congress could establish stronger
federal checks on state tax actions by opening the
federal courts to interstate taxpayers.
I. States Acting Badly
A. Revenue Agencies
Examples of state tax auditors and revenue
agency managers acting improperly (or, perhaps
more generously, “acting ulta vires”) abound.
Every state tax practitioner knows, for instance,
the virtually universal use of penalties, or the
threat of penalty imposition, as a way to pressure
taxpayers into settling audits. As a practical
matter, it seems totally relevant that the operative
statutes clearly provide that the penalties are to be
imposed only if the taxpayer fails to show that it
had acted reasonably in completing the tax return,
filing the return, or paying the tax (although

4

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 543 U.S. __ (2018).

5

Franchise Tax Board of State of California v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev.
2017), cert. granted, Dkt. No. 17-1299 (U.S. June 28, 2018).
6

Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, No. CL17001145-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2018).
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penalty statutes are often worded in the opposite
way: initial penalty imposition required, but
abatement, waiving, or cancellation of the
penalties on the showing of reasonable cause).
The misuse of penalties by state tax auditors is so
common and widespread that practitioners are
fully shocked when the threat of penalties is not in
the auditors’ initial salvo.
At a more senior level, state tax administrators
appear, from time to time, to turn a blind eye to
inappropriate and irresponsible behavior of
midlevel managers in their agencies. For example,
the revenue agency in one mid-Atlantic state
takes the same untenable positions — year after
year — and then closes the case with the taxpayer
paying a mere token percentage of the amount
sought in the statutory notice. Although one of us
has considered bringing Civil Rights Act section
1983 action against this agency’s executives,
developments in this area regarding personal
liability of state government officials have
7
dissuaded the client from pursuing that route.
One of those positions from that mid-Atlantic
8
state, that market-based sourcing rather than
cost-of-performance is the appropriate sourcing
rule for receipts from the performance of services,
is clearly wrong because (1) the state’s legislature
passed market-based sourcing explicitly on a
prospective-only basis (for years after those in
audit for several taxpayers) and (2) abundant case
law in the state mandates the use of cost of
performance. When protested to the first
“independent” forum, the taxpayers’
representatives are told — we have actually heard
this in more than one case — that there is too
much evidence to review so the decision will
simply sustain the statutory notice!
B. State Courts
State revenue agencies are not the only state
actors acting poorly; state courts have also

7

See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of
qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’”).
8

Don’t get us started on another common and repeated
mischaracterization of the law by some state revenue authorities — that
cloud computing services are the sale of tangible personal property. See,
e.g., Rosen and Hayes R. Holderness, “Cloud Computing: 1.5 Steps
Forward, 2 Steps Back,” State Tax Notes, June 26, 2017, p. 1257.
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reached tenuous conclusions in cases involving
state taxes. The alternative apportionment cases
9
of Equifax Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue
10
and Vodafone Americas Holdings Inc. v. Roberts
offer examples.
In 2013 the Mississippi Supreme Court
overturned the Mississippi Court of Appeals and
upheld an assessment and penalties against
Equifax. Equifax’s error? It used the cost-ofperformance apportionment method for services
mandated by regulations promulgated under
Mississippi law. Because Equifax performed its
services in Georgia, not Mississippi, its income
was apportioned to Georgia and was thus not
subject to Mississippi tax. On audit, the
Mississippi Department of Revenue applied an
alternative method of apportionment (using
market-based sourcing) to determine Equifax’s
income subject to tax, without providing any
justification for its selection of the alternative
apportionment method. Unsurprisingly, this
action resulted in substantial additional tax for
Equifax, as well as penalties.
Even worse, in upholding the assessment and
penalties, Equifax suffered numerous procedural
abuses. While its protest was before the
department, Equifax had no right of discovery or
investigation to determine the basis for the
assessment. Then, at the trial court level, Equifax
was deprived of a right of de novo review by the
trier of fact, despite the relevant statute calling for
de novo review. Even under an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, the trial court
affirmed the penalty assessment even though the
department stipulated that Equifax had prepared
its returns in accordance with the mandated
apportionment method. The trial court also did
not require the department to demonstrate any
justification for prescribing an alternative
apportionment formula for Equifax, but instead
placed the burden on Equifax to prove that the
choice of an alternative apportionment formula
was in error. The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s rulings. Equifax was
effectively penalized and taxed for following the

9

Equifax Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, 125 So. 3d 36 (Miss.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014).
10

Vodafone Americas Holdings Inc. v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn.
2016).
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statute and failing to predict that the department
would use an alternative apportionment method.
Even if Equifax could have predicted the
department’s actions, the Mississippi Supreme
Court still would have placed the burden on
Equifax to show that the use of alternative
apportionment was not warranted. One would
have expected that following the statute would be
the default, and that the department would have
to prove the necessity of an alternative method.
The Mississippi Legislature shared that
expectation, rewriting the law after Equifax to
clearly place the burden on the department in
future situations like this one.11
The story in Vodafone is similar. In that case,
the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
Tennessee Department of Revenue’s use of
alternative apportionment — also to impose
market-based sourcing on a service provider — to
override the statutory cost-of-performance
method that the taxpayer, Vodafone, attempted to
use. Other than to claim that the statutory method
resulted in less revenue for Tennessee than the
alternative method (which, according to the
commissioner, was “straightforward and
conceptually satisfying,” in contrast to the “not so
straightforward” statutory method), the
department failed to show that the statutory
formula did not reflect the taxpayer’s in-state
activities. Instead of requiring the department to
make its case more fully (and perhaps blinded by
sympathies for state revenue), the court left
Vodafone to prove that the department’s action
was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.
Even more troubling, the Vodafone court justified
its conclusion by relying on a 2009 Tennessee
Court of Appeals case, BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Chumley,12 that also failed to
require the department to justify its imposition of
alternative apportionment beyond merely
claiming that alternative apportionment raised
13
more money for the state.

Those decisions lead one to suspect a form of
“judicial drift” occurs, causing state judges to be
heavily biased toward supporting the position of
14
the state revenue agencies. An “us versus them”
attitude, which seems to develop because state
court judges are part of their states’ government
environment and culture, is not conducive to
reaching decisions in tax cases that faithfully
apply the law. Sometimes taxpayers get it wrong,
but sometimes state revenue agencies also get it
wrong. At a minimum, one would expect that
“more revenue” would not suffice as a basis for
statutory interpretation and application.
C. State Legislatures
Two recent state legislative actions
demonstrate that those bodies are feeling
increasingly less constrained by some basic legal
principles and concepts of fairness.
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.
15
Wynne, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a
portion of the Maryland tax scheme that limited
the tax credit that residents could take against
their Maryland local taxes was unconstitutional;
the Maryland General Assembly then, rubbing
salt right into that interstate discrimination
wound, enacted a statute severely limiting the
interest rate taxpayers would be paid on refunds
of those credit amounts. Fortunately, the
Maryland Tax Court, in Wynne v. Comptroller of
Maryland,16 found that an interest limitation on
just those refunds violated the same
constitutional anti-discrimination rule that the
initial tax credit statute had violated. This rare but
welcome taxpayer victory in the Maryland Tax
Court perhaps is due to the high profile of the case
and clear injustice of the Maryland legislature’s
action (the tax court needed only three brief
paragraphs to decide the case).
A deeper concern, however, arises when one
considers the legislation enacted, or being
considered, by numerous state legislatures in

14

11

See Mississippi H.B. 799 (effective Jan. 1, 2015).

12

BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Chumley, 308 S.W.3d 350
(Tenn. App. 2009).
13

See Rosen and Julie M. Skelton, “Desperately Seeking State Tax
Fairness: The Need for Federal Adjudication,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 8,
2011, p. 357.

Cf. Lee Epstein et al., “Ideological Drift among Supreme Court
Justices: Who, When, and How Important,” 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483
(2007) (discussing the shift in ideology of Supreme Court justices
depending on their circumstances).
15

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. __ (2015).

16

Wynne v. Comptroller of Maryland, Dkt. No. 16-IN-OO-0216 (Md. Tax
May 23, 2018).
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attempts to offset the effects of the recent federal
tax changes in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 11597). For example, several states are sponsoring
“charities” to which residents can contribute and
then get a federal income tax deduction for the full
amount in lieu of paying assessed property taxes,
which are now subject to the federal state and
local tax deduction limit of $10,000.17 This effort at
circumventing the clear legislative intent of a tax
law by attempting to “shoehorn” into acceptable
behavior that which a legislative body has
deemed undesirable from a public policy
perspective is precisely what state governments
have been railing against for decades; when
taxpayers engage in such behavior, it is called
“inappropriate tax planning” or “tax sheltering.”
How ironic!
II. Murphy, Wayfair, Crutchfield, and Hyatt
Recent cases lead us to believe that states may
become more unchecked in the exercise of their
tax powers. The recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Murphy v. NCAA concludes merely
that Congress cannot prohibit a state legislature
from enacting some types of gambling
restrictions. The case has nothing to do with a
state’s right, or non-right, to violate the due
process and commerce clauses — either the
common law (that is, due process and dormant
commerce clause) aspects such as nexus rules or
statutory aspects, such as the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
and P.L. 86-272. Nevertheless, based on
18
experience and a tad of recent articles, we expect
some states to misread the case (intentionally or
unintentionally) as saying that states have almost
unlimited flexibility in enacting their laws, with
the U.S. Constitution being a mere quaint
“backdrop.”
Also, in Wayfair, the Court considered South
Dakota’s law that explicitly ran counter to the
Quill physical presence rule for sales and use tax
collection. South Dakota’s win may very well
embolden other states to disregard other federal

restrictions that burden them (the Wayfair
decision makes clear that some prongs of the
Complete Auto Transit commerce clause test still
need to be met).
One already-used check on states’ exceeding
their legal authority and their overall behavior is
their being subject to suit in a sister state’s court
for alleged tortious activity. The long-running
Hyatt case provides a recent example. In Hyatt, an
inventor sued the California Franchise Tax Board
for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct
committed by FTB auditors during audits of the
inventor. This suit was filed in California’s sister
state, Nevada. After years of litigation, including
a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, Hyatt was
awarded substantial damages by the Nevada
courts, and the FTB’s argument that it could not be
hailed into another state’s courts failed. Stinging
from this reprimand, the FTB has appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court one more time, asking it to
overturn the rule from Nevada v. Hall that permits
state actors to be sued in sister state courts. The
Court granted certiorari at the end of June 2018.
As states pursue aggressive tax assessment
efforts, taxpayer suits in other states continue to
19
be relied on as a check on such behavior. For
example, in Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding,
Massachusetts has found itself sued in Virginia
state court over its recently promulgated “cookie
nexus” regulations. The idea of cookie nexus —
that the use of in-state software and cookies
constitutes physical presence — is controversial,
and Crutchfield, the taxpayer bringing the suit, is
seeking a declaratory judgment that the
regulation fails under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
and the Internet Tax Freedom Act. Similar to the
FTB in Hyatt, the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue is arguing that it should not be able to be
20
hailed into Virginia courts. Wins by the FTB or
the Massachusetts DOR on that issue would
remove a serious protection against unreasonable
state tax actions.

19

17

See, e.g., Lauren Loricchio, “State Enacts SALT Deduction Cap
Workaround for Passthroughs,” State Tax Notes, June 11, 2018, p. 1100;
and Loricchio, “Second State Enacts SALT Cap Workaround,” State Tax
Notes, May 14, 2018, p. 746.

See Brief of Indiana and 44 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Hyatt, No. 171299, at *8-11 (U.S., filed Apr. 13, 2018).
20

18

Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of His Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, No. CL17001145-00 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 15, 2018).
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III. Is There Hope?
Interstate taxpayers have, for years, been
justifiably wary of having their tax disputes
adjudicated by state courts in and for the very
state that is seeking additional revenue (in an
assessment situation) or protecting revenue (in
refund situations). As states face fiscal pressures,
some have resorted to “creative” solutions similar
to those discussed above. Those solutions are
harmful to taxpayers and often counter to
legislated state policy. Also, the multistate tax
world is in constant evolution. Today’s businesses
are becoming more fluid and multijurisdictional
in operation. This mobility in commerce raises
profound concerns for the multistate taxpayer,
which must navigate the state tax rules in all the
states in which it operates — not to mention
determining whether it is even subject to tax in the
state to begin with.
To preserve the free flow of commerce
between the states, the need for consistency and
uniformity in interstate taxation is paramount.
Without it, the risk of multistate litigation of the
same issue is high. In recent years taxpayers like
Gillette and Newegg.com have litigated the same
issue in multiple states. Coordinating and
centralizing such litigation would result in
obvious efficiencies by removing the need to
litigate the same issue multiple times and by
providing consistency and certainty in the state
tax world.
Therefore, one solution to those concerns
would be to bring interstate tax disputes to federal
courts, which may be more capable of achieving
impartial resolutions as federal judges are further
removed from state revenue apparatuses.
Unfortunately, the TIA and the common law
comity doctrine have presented hurdles for these
cases reaching federal courts. The TIA prohibits
federal jurisdiction in state tax matters when a
“plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of the State.” The case law applying
the TIA has treated it as a very high bar for federal
21
jurisdiction. Likewise, the comity doctrine,
which the Supreme Court described the TIA as
partially codifying,22 reflects the “federal

21

See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010).

22

Id. at 424.

23

reluctance to interfere with state taxation” and
generally counsels federal courts against claiming
jurisdiction over state tax cases when the state
may have the authority to act.
As the need for uniformity and impartiality in
state tax disputes grows, Congress should
address the lack of objectivity at the state court
level. Not in a substantive way, as pushed for in
the case of sales and use tax collections, but in a
procedural one. By repealing the TIA and
affirmatively granting jurisdiction to the federal
24
courts over interstate tax disputes, Congress
could ease the pressure to legislate state tax
solutions while ensuring that states cannot run
amok, fearless of consequences in many cases. A
simple repeal of the TIA would not suffice; the
affirmative granting of jurisdiction in the federal
courts is needed to overcome the barriers of the
comity doctrine. Obviously, there would be
details to work out, such as the appropriate
burden of proof and persuasion in state tax
matters brought to federal courts, but moving
toward more uniformity and consistency in state
tax has always been and will continue to be an
important process for taxpayers, the national
economy, and states alike.


23

Id.

24

As Rosen and Skelton argued before in, “Desperately Seeking State
Tax Fairness: The Need for Federal Adjudication,” State Tax Notes, Aug.
8, 2011, p. 357: “Of the three federal venues available — district courts,
the Court of Federal Claims, or the Tax Court — the Court of Federal
Claims presents the best option to achieve the important goal of
uniformity. . . . Finally, the Court of Federal Claims is a congressional
court (in contrast to an Article III court), so there are few limitations as to
what role Congress can give it. As a result, the Court of Federal Claims
presents the best solution for uniformity, efficiency, and certainty.”
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